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Introduction
Globalization has two aspects -international trade in goods and services, and international capital mobility. Previous studies have found either of these types of globalization benefits a country. Trade in goods and services leads to greater welfare through, for example, cross-industry or within-industry resource reallocation, increased variety of products, and reduction of consumer prices (e.g., Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014; and Feenstra, 2018b) . 1 Financial integration enhances cross-sectional and intertemporal allocative efficiency, increases international risk sharing, and leads to faster growth and higher standards of living (e.g., Coeurdacier et al., 2018; and Schularick and Steger, 2010) . 2 While previous studies have investigated the effect of international trade or financial integration independently, interactions between the two types of integration have received little attention. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding on how these two types of globalization interact to shape gains from integration by focusing on international trade and an access to a sovereign bond market. This is an empirically relevant question because the share of world trade to world GDP increased from 38 percent to 54 percent from 1990 to 2016 according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b) .
We also observe substantial amount of trade in debt -the median share of external debt stock in GNI is 41 percent in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b) . This paper makes a simple point. As documented in previous empirical works, a loss in endowment caused by a default reduces the sovereign's trade with a foreign country. These mechanisms are rigorously shown using a simple Armington (1969) two-country trade model featuring endogenous sovereign default in incomplete bond markets, following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , and Arellano (2008) . We introduce a one-period sovereign bond that is not state contingent and is subject to limited commitment. The sovereign has an option to default and not pay back its debt at each period, which incurs an exogenous reduction in the endowment. Therefore, a sovereign's incentive to default varies substantially depending on how integrated the country is to the international trade market in which countries trade their endowments.
There are two effects working in different directions to determine a sovereign's incentive to default.
First, a destruction of a country's endowment due to a default reduces the two countries' consumption.
1 Classical gains from trade come from increasing production efficiency according to countries' comparative advantages (David Ricardo; Eaton and Kortum, 2003) . Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980) introduce the Dixit-Stigliz preferences, therefore gains from increased variety of consumption goods. Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) provide a survey of quantitative work on the welfare consequence of international trade. Feenstra (2018b) also discusses a recent literature on sources of gains from trade.
2 Coeurdacier et al. (2018) consider benefits from financial integration in a two-country neoclassical growth model, which incorporates gains from allocative efficiency and international risk-sharing. Schularick and Steger (2010) investigate the effect of financial integration in the first era of globalization and find that an increase in capital flows across countries led to higher growth of real GDP per capita.
3 Gopinath and Neiman (2014) document that imports of Argentina collapsed in the wake of its default from 2000 to 2002. Studying samples of defaults of over 150 countries, Rose (2005) finds that trade declines persistently when a sovereign defaults. Other empirical studies on the impact of defaults on trade flows include Martinez and Sandleris (2011) , Zymek (2012) , and .
We call this the endowment effect and it works to reduce the sovereign's inventive to default. On the other hand, there is a positive terms of trade effect arising from a loss of endowment. A fewer supply of goods from the defaulted country increases the relative price of the home good, which works to increase the defaulted country's welfare. 4 This effect becomes large if the country is larger in terms of size, and mitigates the consumption loss upon default. We demonstrate that under reasonable parameters the former effect dominates the latter, implying that the costs of default are larger under free trade than in autarky. As a result, as the country opens up to international trade, higher costs of default lead to a higher bond price, enabling the sovereign to borrow more. Therefore, trade openness reduces the sovereign's incentive to default, leading to a lower interest rate charged by the foreign creditors and a higher price of its bond. These mechanisms work to increase a country's gains from trade, because by having access to a sovereign bond market, a greater level of openness makes the country more credible to repay its debt, making it possible to borrow more, leading to a greater level of present value consumption and welfare. We emphasize these channels as a new source of gains from trade.
Previous empirical evidence is consistent with our model's predictions. Rose and Spiegel (2004) investigate the link between bond prices and trade volumes to understand whether countries repay their debt out of the fear that default might lead to trade disruption. They find a positive correlation between trade volumes and the claims of sovereign bonds by the creditor country, when they looked at bilateral trade and international banking claims from 20 creditor and 149 debtor countries in 1986-1999 period.
Moreover, Manasse and Roubini (2009) employ a panel dataset of 47 countries from the period and find that a lower trade openness is one of the main predictors of sovereign debt crises. These previous empirical results seem to suggest that sovereigns have more to lose upon default, when they become more open to trade. Furthermore, an empirical result in Edwards (2004) is consistent with our theoretical result that the terms of trade effect dominates in a large country. 5 We also conduct empirical analyses to confirm our model's predictions. By using a panel dataset of 144 countries between 1970 and 2013, we find that countries that were more open in 1970 had a fewer number of defaults than less open countries during the sample period. Furthermore, results suggest that an increase in a country's openness reduces the bond's interest rate and the probability of default as consistent with the theory. We also investigate how these openness effects vary depending on the country size measured by GDP. The model suggests that the terms of trade effect is larger for a large country, meaning that larger countries have less to benefit from the interaction of international goods trade and the sovereign bond market. As consistent with the model, the openness effects are greater for small countries than for large countries. These empirical results imply that the model's underlying mechanisms leading to gains from trade are indeed present in reality.
Lastly, we perform a numerical exercise by calibrating the model to quantify the gains from trade. As is conventional in the debt literature, we employ the case of Argentina for this numerical exercise. 6 It also introduces China as a foreign country because Argentina's trade with China have increased substantially 4 Our model does not include the exchange rates. Therefore, a change in terms of trade only comes from changes in supply and demand of goods.
5 Kennan and Riezman (1988) also theoretically studies the relationship between the size of a country and the terms of trade effect in the context of the impact of imposing tariffs.
6 For example, see Arellano (2008) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , Yue (2010) , Asonuma (2014) , and .
after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which is similar to our theoretical considerations comparing the state of autarky with the one under free trade. These countries serve as an excellent case study to quantify the gains from trade. Results imply substantial additional gains from trade when a sovereign has access to a bond market -gains from trade become three percentage points greater with a sovereign bond market.
This paper contributes to the literature on model-based estimation of gains from trade. An influential paper by Arkolakis et al. (2012) shows that, in a large class of trade models, gains from trade are fully described by a couple of statistics -share of home spending on its domestic products and elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade costs. 7 They show that the "new" trade model of heterogeneous firms and its extensions lead to the exact same value of gains from trade as the traditional trade model.
Moreover, by applying their simple formula, they show that gains from trade for the U.S. are between 0.7 to 1.4 percent, surprisingly smaller than our intuition.
This led to a search for a realistic value of gains from trade by introducing additional channels through which trade affects a country's welfare. 8 For example, Caliendo and Parro (2015) , Melitz and Redding (2014) , and Chaney and Ossa (2013) emphasize the importance of introducing input-output linkages or multiple production stages in amplifying gains from trade. Other studies show that a finite upper bound for firm productivity distribution implies greater gains from trade because it makes trade elasticities to differ across markets and trade costs (Melitz and Redding, 2015) and it restores pro-competitive effects of trade (Feenstra, 2018a) . Ossa (2015) proposes a model with multiple sectors and shows that sectoral differences in trade elasticities significantly magnifies gains from trade. Ramanarayanan (2018) This paper stands in this literature on searching for gains from trade. Although these prior studies employ either a monopolistic competition model of trade (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003; and Chaney, 2008) or a perfect competition model (Eaton and Kortum, 2003) , we revert to Armington (1969) 's model where gains from trade come from increased variety of products only. We consider a novel channel through which a country gains from trade. We incorporate a sovereign bond market in this simple model and show that interactions between the goods market and the sovereign bond market greatly magnifies gains from trade.
Speaking from the trade literature, we are not the first to consider international trade and financial markets jointly. Prior articles investigate how development of financial markets affects trade flows (Manova, 2013) , capital flows (Antrás and Caballero, 2009; Matsuyama, 2005) , and comparative advantage (Beck, 2003) . However, Manova (2013) and Beck (2003) focus on a domestic financial market and they do not consider international flows of capital. Antrás and Caballero (2009) and Matsuyama (2005) consider foreign direct investment or foreign portfolio investment and they are silent about international capital flows through a sovereign bond market. One exception is Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) where they examine how cross-country differences in sovereign risk shape patterns of trade using a model with 7 The class of trade models include Armington (1969) , Krugman (1980) , Melitz (2003) , Chaney (2008) , and Eaton and Kortum (2003) where these models feature four micro-level assumptions as well as three macro-level restrictions they summarize.
8 Again, see Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Feenstra (2018b) for a summary of the literature on gains from trade.
incomplete information.
Speaking from the sovereign debt literature, there is a number of prior studies incorporating international trade in a model of sovereign debt (e.g., Mendoza and Yue, 2012; Cuadra and Sapriza, 2006; Asonuma, 2014; and Gu, 2018) . For example, Cuadra and Sapriza (2006) explore the impact of trade openness and terms of trade shocks on a sovereign's incentive to default or repay. While they also focus on the terms of trade effect, their mechanism differs from ours. In their model, an exogenously given terms of trade deterioration triggers a decline in output, leading to a smaller incentive to raise taxes to repay its debt, resulting in a default. Asonuma (2014) and Gu (2018) also propose models to study mechanisms a sovereign default leads to a real exchange rate depreciation and an income loss. Our focus is crucially different from these prior studies. This paper investigates how the interactions between a sovereign bond market and international trade generate additional gains from trade while none of these prior studies focuses on this.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two period model where a sovereign issues bonds, describing two effects working in different directions to determine the sovereign's default costs. We empirically test the model's theoretical predictions in Section 3. Section 4 provides numerical results. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
Simple two period model

A closed economy
We start from constructing a two period model with a single endowment economy issuing one period defaultable bonds. The setup follows that of Arellano (2008) except that the model presented in this section has two periods only.
The sovereign
Consider a closed endowment economy with two periods, where a benevolent sovereign maximizes the expected utility of the representative household. The representative household's expected utility in the first period is
where β is the discount factor, and governs intertemporal substitution. In the first period, the household Consumption in the first period is
In the second period, the sovereign decides either to repay or to default after observing a realized level of endowment. If it decides to repay, the sovereign will repay D as promised. If it decides to default, the sovereign does not have to repay D but it incurs a loss of a fraction θ of its endowment. 9 One way to interpret this is that a default disrupts the domestic financial sector, by reducing banks' wealth and by reducing banks' access to liquid assets. Previous studies including Perez (2015) , Borensztein and Panizza (2009 ), Brutti (2011 ), and Asonuma et al. (2018 show that a country's default leads to a substantial decline in domestic production due to a disruption of its domestic financial sector.
Therefore, the level of consumption at the second period becomes
The sovereign chooses to default if costs of default are smaller than costs of repaying, θY 2 < D. Thus, given D at period 1, the probability of default becomes F (ε * ) where
Foreign creditors
There are many atomistic risk neutral foreign investors making transactions with the sovereign. They face a world risk free interest rate of 1 + r, and make zero profits. We focus on the representative investor, who takes the price q as given and maximizes its expected consumption by choosing how much to demand credit, D. Therefore, the investor's problem is
From the zero profit condition, the implied price for the sovereign bond becomes:
Equilibrium
Given F (·), equations (2) and (3) determine demanded repayment amount D, prices q = L/D, and the probability of default F (ε * ) for each L that the sovereign demands in the first period. As shown in Calvo (2014) , there are multiple equilibria. The foreign investor can offer two schedules of demanded repayment {D low (L), D high (L)} -the first is with a higher bond price and a lower probability of default and the second is with a lower bond price and a higher probability of default.
Following Calvo (2014), we assume that faced with multiple viable price-debt pairs, the sovereign chooses the lower level of debt. 10 The sovereign takes only the schedule D low (L) as given, and chooses the L that maximizes its expected present value utility. Risk aversion of the sovereign makes the optimal L to be such that the sovereign smooths its consumption over the two periods, by equating marginal utility of consumption in the first period with expected marginal utility in the repayment states in the second period.
9 The assumption of proportional endowment loss is key. Having a constant fraction enables us to highlight our main channels when comparing welfare between free trade and autarky.
10 For example, Arellano (2008) and Stangebye (2016) make similar assumptions. 
An open economy
where lower case c's denote "pre-transfer" consumption, the amount of final goods of the countries as a As a result, if the sovereign repays, the countries' final consumptions are
On the other hand, if the sovereign defaults, these are
11 This simplifying assumption comes from the fact that, in reality, a country's debt is owned by investors in many different countries and a large share of foreign investors comes from countries besides its largest trading partner. For example, in the United States as of 2018, the largest shares of foreign U.S. treasury bill owners come from China (19%), Japan (17%), and Brazil (5%), and other 65 different countries as a whole own 43.56% of foreign-owned U.S. treasury bills (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2018). In the case of Greece, as of 2015, largest twelve private and official creditors own 267.5 euros of credits to Greece. The largest share comes from Germany (25%), France (16%), and Italy (14%) according to Singh (2015) . Our model has two countries for the sake of simplicity and assumes that creditors live in a third country that is not explicitly modeled.
Pre-transfer consumption
We characterize pre-transfer consumptions of the two countries under two regimes: autarky and free trade. Representative consumers in the countries have the following preferences: Goods market clearing conditions are 
where φ = (
The ex-factory price of the foreign country is normalized as unity. Solving the system of equations gives the amount of consumption in each country as follows:
where terms of trade p t is determined as
Given this general solution with an arbitrage value of trade costs, we compare the level of pre-transfer consumption in two states of the world: autarky and free trade. In a closed economy equilibrium, τ and τ * are set as infinity. As a result, pre-transfer consumptions would simply be countries' endowments.
Under free trade where we set τ = τ * = 1, pre-transfer consumptions are
where p t is determined by plugging τ t = τ * t into equation (4), which suggests that consumption is the product of the endowment and the term that captures gains from trade. Also note that the terms of trade is determined solely by the available endowments of the two countries as shown in equation (4).
The sovereign bond contracts (L, D) are denominated in terms of final consumption goods which do not affect the terms of trade p t .
Default decisions
Consider the second period where the sovereign has outstanding debt D. Because we only focus on the second period, time subscripts t are dropped in this section. We assume that a fraction θ of the country's endowment is destroyed upon default. Under autarky, the sovereign defaults if the loss of consumption upon default, or the difference between the pre-transfer consumption with full endowment and one with partially destroyed endowment is smaller than the outstanding debt D.
Default in autarky if
Under free trade, the sovereign makes a similar default decision but an additional channel kicks in. It defaults when the loss of consumption upon default is smaller than outstanding debt D as in the case under autarky. However, each of the two countries' pre-transfer consumptions is now described as a function of their endowments as follows:
The left hand sides of equations (7) and (8) . These theoretical considerations suggest that, when the level of endowment is greater thanȲ , it is less costly to default under free trade than autarky.
To understand the mechanism, it is essential to capture the two forces that come into play when the sovereign opens up to trade. In autarky, the destruction of endowment that occurs upon default linearly affects consumption, as can be seen from equation (5). However, under free trade, the same loss of endowment has additional channels through which a loss of endowment affects a sovereign's incentive to default.
A derivative of c F T (Y ) with respect to Y clarifies how international trade changes a sovereign's incentive to default and it is described as follows:
which shows that the slope of pre-transfer consumption is decomposed in two terms. First, g(p) > 1 captures the part coming from the endowment effect where p is determined by equation (4). Due to a default, the sovereign will not only lose consumption linearly, but also it loses the positive gains from trade that were generated from the destroyed endowment.
The second term captures the terms of trade effect. Since g (p) > 0 and ∂p ∂Y < 0, an endowment loss due to default leads to a more favorable terms of trade for the sovereign. The intuition is as follows.
A decline in output due to default reduces the supply of the good coming from the defaulted country.
This reduction in supply increases the price of that good, leading to a terms-of-trade improvement for the country. This positive terms of trade effect would push consumption up for all range of Y .
This mechanism through the terms of trade effect is in contrast with other papers, for example, that of Cuadra and Sapriza (2006) . In their model, an exogenously given terms of trade deterioration reduces a country's output, reducing its sovereign's incentive to increase taxes to repay its debt, resulting in a default. On the other hand, we do not consider changes in terms of trade prior to default. Instead, we focus on the channel through which a default improves the terms of trade, altering a forward-looking sovereign's incentive to default. 12
Overall incentive to default is determined by the balance between these two forces. Regarding the endowment effect described first, the negative effect on consumption is larger when initial endowment Y is small, which is when gains from trade are greater. Moreover, the terms of trade effect described next works to allocate a larger fraction of total gains from trade of the two countries to a large country. But the endowment destruction effect reduces the size of these total gains from trade. Therefore, under free trade, a sovereign in a small country incurs greater costs of default than that in a large country.
In Appendix A we discuss howȲ changes with different parameter values of (σ, λ, λ * ). We find that as elasticity of substitution increases,Ȳ decreases. This is because a higher elasticity of substitution across goods diminishes gains from trade, thus the terms of trade effects dominate the negative endowment effects. Under reasonable values of the parameters,Ȳ becomes a very high value. Therefore, under realistic parameter values, costs of default are higher under free trade than aurarky in most countries.
Empirical analysis
The model presented in the previous section shows that international trade and an access to a sovereign bond market jointly benefit a country by raising its welfare. The model also yields several testable hypotheses. This section verifies the model's theoretical predictions using data and provides an empirical evidence that the model's underlying mechanisms leading to gains from trade are present.
Cross-sectional regressions
We first examine the relationship between a country's openness and its likelihood to default. The model
suggests that more open countries have a smaller incentive to choose default than less open countries.
We directly test this prediction by investigating the association between countries' openness measured by exports plus imports divided by GDP and the number of defaults.
Default episodes come from various sources. Following Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) , we take the data on default episodes from five different sources (De Paoli et al., 2006; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Levy-Yeyati and Panizza, 2011; Reinhart et al., 2003) . In order to follow up more recent studies on sovereign defaults, we also collect default episodes from Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) , Trebesch and Zabel (2017) , and Kuvshinov and Zimmermann (2017) . These data sources cover defaults on their debt to private creditors. 13 Overlapping episodes across data sources are counted as one episode. We statistically test this relationship between openness and the number of defaults. The dependent variable is the number of defaults, which takes zeros for many countries in the sample and discrete values for the rest of the sample. Therefore, we assume that the number of defaults of country c, y c , follows a Poisson distribution:
where N denotes the number of countries in the sample; X c indicates a vector of explanatory variables for country c, including openness, natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the political stability index; θ θ θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The conditional meaning, in the bottom of the table we report marginal effects of a 100 percentage points increase in openness on the number of defaults. Column (1) regresses the number of defaults on openness only. It shows that, as expected, openness has a negative coefficient and significantly significant at the 1 percent level. Marginal effects are economically sizable. A 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the number of defaults by 2.5.
Column (2) controls for countries' income levels because low-income countries are more likely to have defaults and the level of income seems an important determinant of the propensity to have defaults.
Adding log of GDP per capita reduces the marginal effects of openness but it is still statistically less than zero. Column (3) introduces log of GDP, controlling for market size. Column (4) further adds the debt-to-GDP ratio because the model suggests that a more open country has less incentive to choose to default for the same level of debt. The last column includes the political stability index in order to control for political conditions. Either of these shows that openness has significantly negative effects -a 100 percentage point rise in openness reduces the number of defaults by 1.6 to 3.5, depending upon the set of control variables. Again, these results are consistent with the model's theoretical prediction.
Panel regressions
The regressions in the previous sub-section use cross-sectional variations in the data only to examine the link between initial levels of openness and subsequent number of defaults. This section runs panel regressions to estimate the impact of a change in a country's openness on the likelihood of defaults bonds' interest rates in the same country. Employing a panel dataset makes it possible to examine how openness effects vary depending on the size of countries because we have a large enough number of observations. First, the openness effects on the bond's interest rates are tested by estimating the following equations:
where i c,t denotes the government bond interest rate for private creditors in country c in year t 16 ; X c,t is a vector of control variables including the interest payments-to-GDP ratio, GDP growth rates, natural log of GDP per capita, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the inflation rates, and the default dummy where we closely follow the literature in choosing these control variables (Bellas et al., 2010; Cimadomo et al., 2016) ; α c and β c indicate country fixed effects; and u c,t and e c,t are error terms. Each of α 1 , α α α 2 , β 1 , and β β β 2 denotes a scalar (or a vector) of parameters to be estimated. are defined as those where their GDPs are greater than the 75th percentile of the distribution in 1995 and medium-sized countries are those between the 25th and the 75th percentiles. Small countries are the rest. Country groups do not change over time. 17 Because an interaction term with the large country dummy is introduced, the parameter β 1 measures the effect of openness on the bond interest rates in small countries. Linear combinations of coefficients, (β 1 + β M edium ) and (β 1 + β Large ), capture the effect of openness on the bond interest rates in medium-sized countries and large countries, respectively. The
Second, we estimate the relationship between openness on the likelihood of default. The regression equation is
where P r(Def ault) c,t is the probability of default in country c in year t and we have openness and other control variables in the right-hand side. γ 1 and γ γ γ 2 are parameters to be estimated.ũ c,t indicates an error term. Λ(.) denotes a logistic distribution used to fit the probability of default. Due to the fact that there are many countries experienced no default and there is no time-series variation in the dependent variable for those countries, introducing country fixed effects drops those countries. As a result, we lose a large number of observations. In order to cover as many countries as possible, we do not introduce country fixed effects. Furthermore, in order to partially address endogeneity between default and openness, the (11) for each of the three groups of countries -small countries, medium-sized countries, and large countries.
We obtain data from various sources. The interest rates on external debt are obtained from the (IMF, 2018b) . The data on interest payments come from the Global Financial Development Database (World Bank, 2018a) . The data on GDP and the inflation rate are retrieved from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b) . The data on openness are based on exports-to-GDP ratios and imports-to-GDP ratios from the Penn World Table 9 .0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) . Table 2 presents the results from estimating equations (9) and (10). The dependent variable is expressed in percentage (e.g., 1.2 means that the interest rate is 1.2 percent). The openness variable represents (Imports c + Exports c )/GDP c . As a result, the estimated coefficients represent the impact of a 100 percentage points increase in openness on the bonds' interest rates, expressed in percentage. Column
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(1) regresses the bonds' interest rates on openness only. It shows that a 100 percentage points increase 17 See Appendix C for list of countries in the country groups. We choose the year 1995 to define the country groups because it is in the middle of the sample period. Our results do not depend upon this choice.
18 A number of studies find that a sovereign default reduces trade. See, for example, Rose (2005) , Martinez and Sandleris (2011), Zymek (2012) , Gopinath and Neiman (2014) , and . Equations (9) and (10) examine the contemporaneous relationship between openness and the interest rate because we argue there is virtually no reverse causality from the bond interest rate to openness. in order to identify the openness effects in medium-sized countries (or large countries). See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
openness reduce the bonds' interest rates by 2.4 percent and it is significant at the 1 percent level.
Column (2) introduces interaction terms between openness and D M edium and D Large , respectively, in order to allow different openness effects across countries depending upon their country size. It shows that a greater openness reduces the interest rates only in small countries -the estimated coefficient is -3.3. The openness effects in medium-sized and large countries are -1.8 and 0.9, respectively, but these are statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with the model's theoretical prediction that the openness has greater effects in smaller countries than larger countries. Column (3) introduces the interest payments-to-GDP ratio. Column (4) further adds the GDP growth rate and natural log of GDP per capita. Moreover, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the inflation rate, and the default dummy are added in column (5) as controls. Introducing these controls does not change our result that the openness effects are greater in small countries than larger countries. Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (11) for each group of countries -the first, second and third rows report the openness effects for small countries, medium-sized countries, and large countries, Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X X GDP growth rate X X X ln(GDP per capita) X X Debt-to-GDP ratio X Inflation rate X Arrears-to-GNI ratio X Notes: The table reports marginal effects of a 100 percentage point increase in openness. Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
respectively. The table shows marginal effects of a 100 percentage points increase in openness and deltamethod standard errors are in parentheses. Column (1) regresses the default dummy on openness without introducing any controls. The result shows that a greater level of openness reduces the probability of default in all groups of countries. A 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the default probability by 6.8 percent, 9.8 percent, and 7.7 percent in small, medium-sized, and large countries, respectively.
Following columns incrementally introduce additional control variables -column (2) includes the interest payments-to-GDP ratio; column (3) adds the GDP growth rate; column (4) further incorporates GDP per capita, and the inflation rate and the arrears-to-GNI ratio are included in column (5). By controlling for these variables, the openness effect becomes greater, especially in small countries. For example, column (5) shows that a 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the default probability by 40.7 percent, 16.4 percent, and 11.9 percent in small, medium-sized, and large countries, respectively.
Statistical significance only comes from small countries.
Overall, the empirical results confirm the model's theoretical prediction that a greater level of openness is associated with a lower frequency of defaults and a lower interest rate charged by foreign creditors.
The magnitude of these openness effects is also shown to be different depending on the size of countries measured by GDP. As is consistent with the theory, the effects of openness are greater for smaller countries than larger countries.
Numerical analysis
This section calibrates the model to quantify gains from trade when a country has access to a sovereign bond market. In so doing, the two-period model presented in Section 2 is extended to a general infinite horizon model. The infinite horizon model is used to calibrate the model's parameters and then a numerical simulation is performed to quantify gains from trade.
Infinite horizon model
Sovereign government's problem
Key features in the two period model remain the same in this section. 
Home's expected utility in the initial period is
The pre-transfer consumption of the two countries in each period are the same as in the previous section. In each period, given the endowments {Y t , Y * t }, the two countries obtain pre-transfer consumption schedules denoted in equations (6) and (4). In each period, the state of the economy is described by outstanding government debt and the two countries' endowment {D t , Y t , Y * t }. Given these, the sovereign has the option to default or to repay its debt in each period. Thus the sovereign's value at period t is:
is the value of the sovereign if it repays the debt, which is described as:
is the value of the sovereign if it decides to default. In that case, a fraction θ of Y t is destroyed and the sovereign is excluded from the foreign bond market. From the next period, the sovereign repays its debt with probability π with zero outstanding debt. As a result, the value function becomes:
Note that in this infinite horizon model, the sovereign incurs not only direct output costs upon default but also costs from being excluded from the international capital market. Thus, in each period, the sovereign makes a default decision by considering the balance between the present value costs of paying its debt and the present value costs of an output loss and costs from not being able to smooth consumption.
Foreign investors' problem
Foreign investors reside outside the two economies, and they are small and large in numbers. Taking the bond price q t+1 as given, the investors maximize their profits:
which is zero in equilibrium. 1{Repay} is an indicator function takes 1 if the sovereign repays its debt and zero otherwise. The implied price for the sovereign bond is
Recursive equilibrium
We assume that the endowment processes of the two countries follow a log-normal AR(1) process.
Shocks to the two streams are uncorrelated. The processes are described as follows:
where
and (Ȳ t ,Ȳ * t ) are mean incomes of the two economies. Summing all up, exogenous parameters of the model are {β, r, , λ, λ * , σ, θ, π ρ, ρ * , σ, σ * } and the state of the economy is described by three variables {D t , Y t , Y * t }. The recursive equilibrium of this economy is a set of policy functions for (a) home and foreign's pre-transfer consumption; (b) sovereign's default decision and bond issuance; and (c) bond price functions, such that (i) Taking the price of bonds and the relative price of goods as given, both the sovereign and foreign pre-transfer consumption satisfy their optimization problem; (i') When faced with multiple viable debt-price schedules, the sovereign chooses the one with lower debt; (ii) The good market clears; (iii) Taking the bond price as given, the sovereign's default decision satisfies its dynamic problem; (iv) The bond price reflects the sovereign's default probability and is consistent with the investors' maximization problem.
Calibration and simulation
We consider a two-country world where there are Argentina and China because these countries provide an excellent example of the model's theoretical set up -one country, Argentina, benefits from access to a sovereign bond market while it opens up with another country, China. 19 Figure 4 shows bilateral trade flows between Argentina and China (as shares of Argentina's GDP) from 1993 to 2013. It shows that Argentina's exports to China and its imports from China increased drastically after 2001, China's accession to the World Trade Organization. We employ Argentina's opening up to trade with China as an ideal case to study its gains from trade.
In this experiment, we compare the two states of the world as in the previous sections. The first is analogous to the autarky economy in previous theoretical analyses. We estimate the endowment shock process from the real GDP sequence of Argentina from 1993 to 2013, and compute the recursive equilibrium defined in the previous section, but with infinite trade costs. The second is analogous to the free trade economy with two countries. We also estimate the Chinese endowment process using the Chinese real In the numerical analysis, we modify the endowment costs that the sovereign has to incur upon default.
Instead of assuming that an uniform fraction of endowment is destroyed upon default, we assume that 19 Previous articles conducting calibration analyses by employing Argentina's case to study sovereign debt include Arellano (2008) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , Yue (2010) , Asonuma (2014) , and . the level of endowment upon default is determined as follows:
which implies that the fraction of destroyed endowment is weakly increasing in the endowment size. This construction is the same as Arellano (2008) . When a realized output level is low, the sovereign does not suffer any output destruction and is only deprived of its ability to smooth consumption. But when a realized level of endowment is greater than a certain threshold, the sovereign starts to suffer from an increasing fraction of direct output loss upon default.
We need this assumption that default costs are larger in "good times" than in "bad times" in order to match empirical observations that a country is more likely to default when it is facing with a lower level endowment or a lower GDP growth rate (e.g., Kuvshinov and Zimmermann, 2017) . This assumption is also consistent with models with endogenous production. Mendoza and Yue (2012) assume that domestic firms lose access to world credit markets upon sovereign default, thus cannot finance working capital to import a certain fraction of intermediate goods. Under this setup, they find that a GDP loss upon default is increasing in the size of a negative TFP shock.
Data and parameters
Argentinian and Chinese quarterly GDP data are taken from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), respectively. 20 We estimate parameters governing the endowment processes in equation (12) using a maximum log-likelihood method. 21
Estimated parameters are ρ = 0.91, ρ * = 0.81, σ = 0.015, and σ * = 0.016, where Argentina is the Home country and China is the Foreign country. Given the estimated endowment processes, we then discretize the process into a finite state Markov chain using the procedures described in Hussey and Tauchen (1991) . Table 4 summarizes parameter specifications. The discount rate β = 0.86 follows Asonuma (2014) , which is set to match Argentina's average default frequency documented in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) . Risk free rate r is set to be 0.017 as in Arellano (2008) . The coefficient of risk aversion is assumed to be 2 following the literature. 22 The endowment threshold γ also follows Arellano (2008) and set to be 0.969. The probability of reentry π is set as 0.282 which is consistent with empirical findings in Gelos et al. (2011) . Figure 5 shows bond price schedules under autarky and free trade. The price schedules show that the sovereign faces higher prices for the same amount of debt under free trade, reflecting a lower probability of default. Though the basic structure of the model remains the same as the two period model, the size of 20 The data on Argentinian GDP are converted to constant 2005 USD prices using inflation and exchange rates from US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Central Bank of Argentina. The data on Chinese GDP are converted to constant 2005 USD prices using inflation and exchange rates from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b) , and the People's Bank of China. It is also seasonally adjusted by X-12-ARIMA Seasonal Adjustment Program by the US Census Bureau. 21 We detrend the data with Hodrick-Prescott filter using smoothing parameter of 1600. 22 Asonuma (2014) , , and Kollmann (1996) also set their risk aversion coefficients to the same number. (1) persistence ρ = 0.91, ρ * = 0.81 Estimated AR(1) standard deviation σ = 0.016, σ * = 0.015 Estimated the changes in prices due to trade seems smaller in this infinite horizon model. This comes from the fact that we make a slightly different assumption on an output loss due to default. Previously we assumed an uniform two percent reduction in endowment. In this section, however, output declines only when the level of endowment is higher than 97 percent of its mean value. Thus, for endowments in the lower half of the distribution, default costs are zero. This reduces the difference of default costs between free trade and autarky, resulting in smaller bond price differences. Table 4 for parameter values.
Results
There are two sources that a sovereign gains from trade. One is traditional gains from trade coming from "love of variety" features in the CES utility function. The other comes from a country's ability to smooth out consumption by issuing bonds. This second channel of consumption smoothing is affected by two forces creating incompleteness of the bond market.
The first is the fact that sovereign bonds are state non-contingent. By issuing state non-contingent bonds, the sovereign tries to smooth consumption paths as in Mendoza (1991) . But since the sovereign's discount rate β is smaller than the world discount rate 1/(1 + r), an impatient sovereign will always borrow. Moreover, endogenous bond prices make it easier to borrow when the level of endowment is greater. This is because the probability of default is lower in such situation. As a result, the sovereign borrows more in a good time than in a bad time.
Second, bonds are defaultable. By defaulting when endowments are low and there is large outstanding debt, the sovereign mitigates the negative effects on consumption due to a low endowment shock. Since it is harder for the sovereign to borrow when the endowment is low, it defaults even with smaller outstanding debt in low endowment periods. Therefore this defaulting channel works as a consumption smoothing mechanism, which is similar to the notion explained in Zame (1993) . Arellano (2008) . By having trade with another country, the sovereign's default probability decreases, which in turn increases its sovereign bond price.
It shows that the average debt-to-output ratio is smaller under free trade. The sovereign's capacity to accumulate debt expands when it moves from autarky to free trade. However, output also increases due to trade. As a result, the debt-to-output ratio declines.
Facing more favorable bond prices, the sovereign benefits from not only traditional gains from trade but also an additional intertemporal gains from trade. market.
An increase in welfare without bond issuance is calculated using the corresponding endowment sequences that are used in the simulation. The welfare gains from trade are around 16 percent in the baseline case where we assume σ = 5, and it is consistent with the present value of the static gains from trade. On the other hand, the gains from opening up to trade when the sovereign is issuing bonds become 19 percent. The difference between these two gains -around three percentage points -comes from Table 4 for other parameter values.
the fact that the sovereign has more capacity to borrow, and faces higher bond price. Therefore, the sovereign enjoys additional gains from trade from the sovereign bond market, which is around one fifth of the traditional gains from trade.
Results from the robustness checks show that gains from trade change by assuming different values of elasticity of substitution: σ = 3 and σ = 7. As expected, a higher substitutability reduces gains from trade. But it also diminishes additional gains from an access to a sovereign bond market. Recall Figure 1 in Section 2.2.2. In the static version of the model, a higher substitutability reduces the region of the home country's endowment where default cost is higher under free trade than in autarky. In other words, a higher σ decreasesȲ . This means that for Y that is less thanȲ , the slope of the consumption schedule in free trade diminishes and becomes closer to that of the consumption schedule in autarky. Costs of default are still higher than under autarky, but the costs diminish as the elasticity of substitution increases. The difference in gains from trade between free trade and autarky becomes smaller, which works to reduce additional gains by opening up to trade. Nevertheless, we find that the additional gains that come from the sovereign bond market are substantial in magnitude.
Though the source of the additional gains from trade is different, we find that our estimates on additional gains from trade are in the same ballpark as those from other papers. Melitz and Redding Note that the results do not exactly reveal Argentina's actual gains from trade with China. Obviously, the results are limited given the stylized setup of the model. Nevertheless, they are informative in grasping the magnitude of how much a sovereign gains through the bond market by opening up to trade.
Conclusion
We have investigated how interactions between international trade and access to the sovereign bond market shape a country's gains from trade by using an Armington (1969) 's model of trade with a sovereign bond market a la Arellano (2008) . As is conventional in the literature, the model assumes that a default reduces a country's output, which in turn reduces the country's imports and exports. As a result, a greater openness of a country makes a default more costly because the country loses a greater amount of consumption due to a default. Therefore, a greater openness reduces a likelihood of default, reducing the interest rate charged by foreign creditors.
These mechanisms are confirmed by a cross-sectional regression as well as a panel regression. Indeed, more open countries have a fewer defaults than less open countries and an increase in a country's openness reduces the country's bond interest rate. The regression results also imply that the effect of openness on the probability of default and the bonds' interest rate depends on its country size measured by GDP, which is consistent with the model's theoretical predictions.
These empirical results confirm that the model's underlying mechanisms leading to gains from trade are present. By opening up to trade, the country reduces the probability of default because it becomes more costly to default, leading to a lower interest rate and a higher price of its sovereign bond. This results in a greater level of consumption, therefore a higher level of welfare. As a result, an access to sovereign bond market works to magnify gains from trade. Our numerical exercise shows that gains from trade become about three parentage points greater by introducing a sovereign bond market. This suggests one reason why conventional trade models, which do not have a sovereign bond market, lead to surprisingly small gains from trade as shown by Arkolakis et al. (2012) .
Appendix A Pre-transfer consumption schedules in autarky and free trade
This section shows that there is a threshold value of Y such that if the endowment is below that amount, costs of default would be greater under free trade than under autarky. We also show numerically that the threshold is very large under reasonable parameter values. Figure 1 illustrates the pre-transfer consumption schedules under autarky and free trade, as functions of Y . It assumes that Y * is fixed. The two schedules are as defined in equations (5) and (6):
Given these schedules, the costs of default are represented by the slope of the consumption schedules. If the slope is greater, then the loss of consumption due to a default is greater.
We know that both consumptions will be zero when the endowment Y is zero.
Also, as Y goes to infinity, gains from trade will disappear (g(p) → 1), and the two consumption schedules will converge as described as follows:
In addition, positive gains from trade, g(p) > 1, assure that consumption under free trade is greater than that under autarky.
Therefore, using the mean value theorem, there exists at least one Y ∈ (0, ∞) such that the slope of the free trade consumption is equal to that under autarky.
Take a sequence of {Ȳ } that satisfies equation (A.1), and order them as
For all values of Y such that Y <Ȳ , the slope of the consumption schedule is greater under free trade than autarky, meaning that default costs are also greater. Figure A1 plots numerically determinedȲ 's, relative toȲ * . As elasticity of substitution increases, the gains from trade diminish thus the terms of trade effects dominate. This lowers the value ofȲ . Also, as foreign bias increases, the terms of trade deteriorates since the foreign country values home's good less. This pushes up the value ofȲ . Lastly, a change in the sovereign's home bias has an ambiguous effect onȲ . An increase in home bias improves its terms of trade, but at the same time the sovereign values imported goods less.
Nevertheless, one can see from these plots that, under reasonable parameters -σ ≈ 5, and the home bias parameter is greater than 0.5 -the value ofȲ is very large. In the numerical exercise in Section 4, the variable space comfortably fits into the region where Y <Ȳ . Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) , Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011 ), Laeven and Valencia (2008 ), and Reinhart et al. (2003 are retrieved from a summary table in Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) . The political stability index is the mean of seven political stability indices including government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profiles, internal conflicts, external conflicts, corruption, and military in politics. Table A1 presents summary statistics of variables used in Table 1 . Table A2 presents summary  statistics of variables used in Tables 2 and 3 . Summary statistics of additional variables for robustness checks in Appendix D are presented in Table A3 . These summary statistics are for the sample used in column (1) of each of the regression tables. Therefore, the sample sizes are the same for some variables. 
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D Robustness checks D.1 Paris Club debt restructurings
Section 3 in the main text examines the openness effects on countries' defaults on their debt owned by, and the bond interest rates for, private creditors. This is because our theoretical model implicitly assumes that a country's debt is owned by private creditors -due to the assumption that there are many and animistic creditors. However, it is important to consider debt restructurings with official creditors in the empirical context because official creditors have played a critical role in debt restructurings (Cheng et al., 2018) . As explained in Das et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2018) , since 1956 the Paris Club has conducted debt rescheduling negotiation with creditors in an organized manner.
The purpose of this section is to show our empirical results presented in the main text also hold true even if we consider creditors in the public sector. We examine the effect of openness on Paris Club debt restructurings, which are debt negotiations with creditors from the public sector, and the bond interest rate for official public sector creditors. We employ the data on Paris Club debt restructurings from Das et al. (2012) , covering episodes during 1950-2010. We only use the data after 1970, covering 411 episodes. See Das et al. (2012) for a list of debt restructuring episodes. Figure A2 We also use a panel dataset to investigate the relationship between openness and the bond's interest rate charged by official creditors and to examine if the openness effects vary by country size. Table  A4 summarizes results from estimating equations (9) and (10) by employing the bonds' interest rate for official creditors as the dependent variable. Column (5), introducing the largest number of control variables, shows that a 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the bonds' interest rate by 2.18 percent in small countries. Estimated marginal effects of openness, reported in the bottom of the table, are insignificant for middle-sized countries and large countries. However, the size of the coefficients are consistent with the theory -the openness effects are smaller for larger countries. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Table 2 . in order to identify the openness effects in medium-sized countries (or large countries). See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries. Table A5 shows results from estimating equation (11) by replacing the private-sector default dummy with the Paris Club debt restructuring dummy. The table is presented in the same manner as for Table 3 . Column (5) shows that a 100 percentage increase in openness reduces the probability of Paris Club debt restructuring by 40.7 percent in small countries. The same change in openness reduces the probability of debt restructuring by 16.4 percent and 11.9 percent in medium-sized and large countries, respectively. Again, the results summarized in Table A5 are essentially the same as the ones in Table 3 .
Overall, the empirical analyses presented in this section show that the model's theoretical predictions are consistent with the data even if we consider countries' debt restructurings with official creditorsParis Club debt restructurings -and the interest rates on external debt for creditors from the public sector. To summarize, a greater openness reduces the probability of debt restructurings and the bonds' interest rate. Also, these openness effects are greater for small countries than larger countries. Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X X GDP growth rate X X X ln(GDP per capita) X X Debt-to-GDP ratio X Inflation rate X Arrears-to-GNI ratio X Notes: The table reports marginal effects of a 100 percentage point increase in openness. Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
D.2 Addressing potential endogeneity of openness
Openness is potentially subject to endogeneity. A sovereign default reduces imports and exports as documented in a number of articles (e.g., Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011; Zymek, 2012; . Therefore, countries that experienced a default in the past may have a lower degree of openness. Moreover, as shown in , a previously defaulted country is more likely to have a default in the following years for the same value of debt-to-GDP ratio. As a result, a combination of these facts results in a spurious negative relationship between openness and the default likelihoodtherefore the bonds' interest rate -because a smaller openness caused by a previous default would seem to be related with the next default that is actually caused by serial defaulters' other characteristics. This section addresses this potential issue by using a 2SLS.
D.2.1 Identification strategy
Our identification strategy is similar to Romalis (2007) where he examines the effect of trade openness on countries' GDP growth rates by instrumenting openness by tariffs. A reduction of tariffs increases imports of the country, which increases its openness. One may argue that tariffs do not satisfy the exclusion restriction because it directly affects the likelihood of default by changing the country's tariff revenue, therefore its overall fiscal revenue. However, countries' tariff revenue accounts for a small share of the overall fiscal revenue. As of 1970, for example, the medium share of tariff revenue in total fiscal revenue is eight percent according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b) . Therefore, we argue that tariffs do not have a statistically significant direct effect on our dependent variables. Also, statistical tests suggest that tariffs are indeed a valid instrument (see Sargan statistics in Tables A6 and  A7) .
We also employ the average tariff rate applied by all other countries besides the country as instrument. The variable is defined as follows:
where T c denotes tariff rates applied by country c and N is the number of countries that tariff data are available. A reduction of tariffs applied by all other countries increases exports from the country, which increases openness. However, changes in tariffs applied by all other countries do not affect the country's default likelihood and the bond interest rate other than through openness. Therefore, this variable is a valid instrument. These tariffs variables are introduced to regression as ln(1 + T c /100) and ln(1 + T Other c /100), respectively. Regressions in the main text introduce interaction terms between openness and country size dummy variables in order to investigate if the openness effects vary across countries. However, instead of introducing interaction terms, in this section we split the sample into two groups -small countries and larger countries (medium-sized and large countries) -because it is hard to instrument both openness and its interaction terms. We divide the sample to two groups (instead of three groups) in order to keep the sample size as great as possible because IV estimates lose consistency for a small sample. Small countries are classified as one group because we are particularly interested in openness effects in small countries. Table A6 shows results from estimating the openness effects on the bonds' interest rates. It uses the same sets of controls as for Table 2 . Panel A shows results with a full sample, suggesting that a 1 percentage point increase in openness reduces the bonds' interest rates by 0.11 to 0.21 percent. The openness effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all columns. Results from small countries and medium-sized & large countries are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. These show that small countries have greater openness effects than larger countries. A 1 percentage point increase in openness reduces the bonds' interest rates by 0.16 to 0.40 percent in small countries. On the other hand, the same increase in openness reduces the bond interest rates by 0.10 to 0.14 percent only in larger countries. These results are qualitatively similar to the ones in Table 2 .
D.2.2 The bonds' interest rate
D.2.3 Countries' credit ratings
We are also interested in the effect of openness on the default likelihood. However, it is hard find the instrumented effect of openness on the default probability because the dependent variable is a default dummy, which takes either 0 or 1, and it is not a continuous variable. Note that the instrumented openness effects are the local average treatment effect of changes in openness caused by changes in tariffs. If the dependent variable were a dummy taking 1 only if there is a default, we observe an event of default at an extreme situation that a country cannot repay its debt. A change in tariffs alters openness, which in turn affects the default probability but we do not observe a default event unless the change in the default probability is extreme. As a result, the local average treatment effect of changes in openness caused by tariffs would be seriously biased. Therefore, we employ countries' credit ratings as a proxy of default probability. Data on credit ratings are retrieved from the Institutional Investor Magazine. It takes a value between 0 and 100 and a greater value means that its credit rating is better. Openness is instrumented by the tariff rate applied by a country and the average tariff rate applied by all other countries besides that country. All regressions include a constant term and country fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries. Table A7 shows results from estimating regressions employing countries' credit ratings as the dependent variable. A greater openness raises the country's credit rating. Therefore, we expect positive coefficients for openness. Panel A describes results from using a full sample. It shows that a 1 percentage point increase in openness raises credit ratings by 0.74 to 0.95. The openness effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all columns.
Results from using small countries and medium-sized & large countries are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. These show that the openness effects are greater for small countries than larger countries. A 1 percentage point increase in openness raises credit ratings by 0.9 to 1.1 in small countries. On the other hand, the same increase in openness raises credit ratings by 0.56 to 0.89 only in larger countries. Overall, these results suggest the estimated effects of openness are consistent with the model's theoretical predictions. The table shows the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in openness on countries' credit ratings (100 = best, and 0 = worst). Openness is instrumented by the tariff rate applied by a country and the average tariff rate applied by all other countries besides that country. All regressions include a constant term and country fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries. 
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